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fter 16 years of unbroken Fianna Fáil rule, the first four of the five general
elections of the period 1948-1963 saw sitting governments unseated.
Economic policy pivoted: protectionism was abandoned; foreign direct
investment welcomed and an application for membership was made to the
EEC. Whitaker’s Economic Development appeared in 1958. Lemass took over
from de Valera as Taoiseach in 1959. The ‘long 1950s’ remains of enduring
fascination to Irish historians.
Conventional wisdom accords the bulk of the credit for the turnaround in
policy to Seán Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce in most Fianna
Fáil governments since 1932 and Taoiseach from 1959 to 1966, and T. K.
Whitaker, Secretary of the Department of Finance from 1956 to 1969. This
arguably downplays the importance of the intensified electoral competition of
the time, and undervalues the achievements of the second inter-party
government, which introduced export profits tax relief – the genesis of
Ireland’s low corporation tax regime – in 1956. Fine Gael and Labour had long
advocated liberalising the restrictions on foreign ownership of industry before
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* This paper forms part of an IRCHSS-sponsored project: “Turning Globalisation to National
Advantage: Economic Policy Lessons from Ireland’s Experience”.
03 Barry article_ESRI Vol 42-2  12/07/2011  10:35  Page 159Fianna Fáil finally yielded (Bew and Patterson, 1982, McCarthy, 1990).
Whitaker’s particular role in the reform process is – to our minds – seriously
misrepresented by Walsh and Whelan (2010) in a recent paper in this journal.
The present note assesses their main assertions in this regard in the light of
information available from the archival records. 
II  THE WALSH AND WHELAN THESIS
Walsh and Whelan (2010) refer throughout to “Whitaker’s export-oriented
industrial policy”, which was based, they argue, on the development of
linkages with new and largely foreign-owned industry attracted by “export tax
relief and capital grants”. His thinking on linkages was supposedly based on
the advice of Louden Ryan, a TCD economist whom “Whitaker appointed (to)
a Capital Investment Advisory Committee” established by the government in
1956. They assert, furthermore, that Whitaker “… manages the drive towards
free trade in a controlled and phased manner… The phased diminution of
tariffs and the gradual introduction of exporting incentives were implemented
to minimise the political instability of implementing free trade”. 
Barry (2009a, 2010) has written previously of the process of ‘juggernaut’
reforms to which the introduction of export profits tax relief (EPTR) by the
second inter-party government gave rise: “While EPTR did not directly
threaten established (protectionist) interests, it led to a considerable
strengthening of the export lobby. This increased the pressure for further
liberalisation”. Walsh and Whelan suggest that this was planned by Whitaker:
“Politically, Whitaker realised that in order to navigate the move to free trade,
the introduction of export tax incentives (yielding positive gains) should be
embedded first. Then, once the benefits from these reforms have taken hold in
the economy, the more painful reforms of tariff reductions should be
implemented, but in a phased way”. As past of this strategy, they claim,
“Whitaker backed green field exporting companies based outside Dublin to
deliver prosperity for Ireland, even though the jobs and power were on the side
of the traditional, heavily unionised and highly protected industries in the
greater Dublin area”.
III  THE HISTORICAL RECORD
Tariff Reductions as an Element of Broader Industrial Strategy?
Whitaker’s 1956 paper to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society is
generally seen as the seminal document setting out his economic philosophy
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“While the opportunity for industrial expansion afforded even by our limited
home market has not yet been fully availed of”, the paper argues, “… it would
be unduly restrictive to concentrate attention on the home market alone. It is
much more important that industrialists, whether native or foreign, should be
induced to establish industries here capable of competing in export markets”.
This is the only reference to foreign investment in the document, and
Whitakerappearsto count himself among the many for whom “…an industrial
expansion based mainly on agricultural raw materials (has) seemed the most
sensible form of development in our circumstances, as being more natural,
more secure and of greater assistance to our balance of payments”. The
broader strategy on which he focuses here consists of supply-side measures to
supplement liberalisation: education and technical training, reduced taxation,
tackling of restrictive work practices, provision of utilities including power
supplies and transport services, and a closer alignment of pay to productivity. 
The later civil service debates on trade liberalisation to which Walsh and
Whelan refer took place between October 1959 and January 1960 and largely
pitched the Department of Finance (in the person of T.K. Whitaker) against
the Department of Industry and Commerce (in the person of its secretary,
J.C.B. MacCarthy), with occasional interventions from Agriculture, Foreign
Affairs, the Department of the Taoiseach and others. The memos were drawn
together and published by T.K. Whitaker in 2006 under the title Protection or
Free Trade – The Final Battle. As Whitaker explains, this “semi-official”
correspondence was intended especially for the eyes of Seán Lemass, who had
assumed office as Taoiseach only a few months previously. 
The debates were triggered by the need to decide whether or not to apply
for membership of EFTA, the seven-country free trade area established in
1960 in response to the formation of the EEC, and in which the UK was the
dominant economy. Membership would have entailed reducing industrial
protection and exposing the domestic market to further competition. Whitaker
believed that this would be beneficial and would improve Irish industrial
export prospects. Industry and Commerce argued to the contrary that the
effects of membership would be catastrophic. 
Whitaker is ultimately swayed not by Industry and Commerce but by a
memo from the Department of Agriculture which argues that EFTA
membership would probably require Britain to extend equivalent agricultural
access to other EFTA member states and that Irish interests would therefore
be best served by seeking a Free Trade Area arrangement with Britain alone
(Barry, 2009b).
Whitaker continues to emphasise the ‘pure’ case for trade liberalisation
however. The Department of Finance memo of December 14, 1959 entitled
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● The inadequacy of protectionism as a remedy for the problems of
unemployment and emigration had become obvious. 
● Action was becoming more urgent as competition in export markets would
grow as other European countries achieved greater specialisation, higher
output and lower costs through tariff reductions and freer trade.
● As long as protection was maintained, there would be no compulsion to
increase quality and efficiency.
● High costs in protected industries were being transmitted to other sectors.
This reduced competitiveness more generally, and the consequent lower  -
ing of living standards vis-à-vis Britain encouraged emigration.
There is no evidence here of the strategising suggested by Walsh and Whelan.
The argument is for immediate across-the-board tariff cuts.1
Export Profits Tax Relief
Export Profits Tax Relief was announced by Taoiseach John A. Costello,
leader of the second inter-party government, in a speech to an inter-party
meeting on 5 October 1956 and included in the Finance (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Bill which was passed by the Oireachtas shortly thereafter.2
The proposal for export profits tax relief had first surfaced in a 1945
Foreign Trade (Development) Bill prepared by the Department of Industry
and Commerce. This was ultimately withdrawn in the face of opposition from
the Department of Finance, which deemed the proposals to be “objectionable
in principle”. Were public funds to be allocated to stimulate the export trade,
Finance agued, “… this assistance should take the form either of a direct
subsidy which can be effectively measured, or of loans and grants analogous
to those in operation in Northern Ireland”.3
The Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners repeated
these objections each time the proposal resurfaced, as it did on various
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for Industry and Commerce requested Finance to revisit the matter. The
request was passed to the Revenue Commissioners who replied, in a memo to
Finance of July 31, 1956, that “… the fair distribution of the income tax charge
is an essential element of the tax system” and that “… there are activities
other than exports that are just as important even from the point of view of
the balance of payments”. On September 20, Whitaker wrote to his minister
that such relief would be contrary to Irish obligations to the OEEC.
Furthermore, “I have always felt that it is production which should be aided
rather than exports” and the proposal, if implemented, would further postpone
the day “… when we can bring farming profits within the income tax net”. The
Minister of Finance endorsed these points in his memo to government
advocating that the proposal be rejected.4 On this occasion however, Whitaker
and his Department were overruled by the Taoiseach and Export Profits Tax
Relief was introduced.5
The 50 per cent tax remission introduced by the inter-party government
was expanded to 100 per cent by Fianna Fáil shortly after the latter’s return
to power in 1957. In the face of this, Whitaker argued continuously that double
taxation relief was to be preferred from Ireland’s point of view. On the opening
of a Danish-run fish farm in Ireland in 1958, he wrote to the Minister for
Lands that “… nothing we can do will relieve the Danes of all tax on their
income from the trout farm. A double taxation agreement would secure that
they paid only one tax – and that tax to the Irish Exchequer. The exports tax
concession will secure that they pay one tax – but to the Danish Exchequer.”6
He asserted later that “Department of Finance concerns regarding the policy
remain, and remain the same.”7
Decentralisation
Walsh and Whelan write that “Whitaker backed green field exporting
companies based outside Dublin to deliver prosperity for Ireland even though
the jobs and power were on the side of the traditional, heavily unionised and
highly protected industries in the greater Dublin area.”
Garret FitzGerald, in a 1959 paper to which the title of the present note
pays homage, directly contradicts this. He writes that “… the policy of
encouraging decentralisation of industry by means of special grants finds little
support in Economic Development. Mr Whitaker remarks that with virtually
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especially, by providing more extensive grants for industrial development in
these areas than in other better favoured parts of the country”.
Chapter 24, paragraph 31 (c) of Economic Development states explicitly
that “… a realistic appraisal of development prospects indicates that, apart
from exceptional cases, industries must be at or near the larger centres of
population. Special subsidisation of remote areas by more extensive grants for
industrial development is wasteful and retards progress in areas better
situated”. Whitaker’s recommendation was not incorporated in the govern  -
ment’s First Programme for Economic Development (1958). McCarthy (1990, p.
62) suggests that “… the impetus for this decision doubtless was Fianna Fáil’s
desire not to alienate its traditional support in rural areas”. 
Decentralisation was supported by the Department of Industry and
Commerce, of which Lemass was minister at the time. The Department
argued that the Whitaker proposal “… would nullify the objective of the
Undeveloped Areas Act”, though it was prepared to “… envisage the possibility
of larger grants outside the undeveloped areas than at present, particularly
where a new industry might otherwise be lost to the country”.8
Linkages and “Whitaker’s Industrial Policy”
Walsh and Whelan assert that Whitaker appointed academic economic
advisors, including Louden Ryan, to the Capital Investment Advisory
Committee established by government in 1956. Lee (1989, p. 343), drawing on
Fanning (1979, p. 507), provides a very different account, writing that “… the
Capital Investment Advisory Committee, established in late 1956, came, it
would appear, as a nasty surprise to Finance. This seems to have been
established by the cabinet, and to have had the bulk of its membership
nominated without reference to Finance. Neither the chairman, John Leydon,
who had resigned as Secretary of Industry and Commerce in 1956, nor the two
young economists on the committee, Patrick Lynch and Louden Ryan, were
likely to display an excessive reverence for the traditional Finance approach”. 
Walsh and Whelan extrapolate from the fact that Whitaker and Ryan
interacted across various committees and societies to suggest that “Whitaker
shaped policy on the advice of the economist Louden Ryan, who in turn based
his concept of the importance of industry linkages in Ireland’s development on
the theoretical framework put forth by (Albert) Hirschman”.
Industrial policy was not however under Whitaker’s remit, but under that
of the Department of Industry and Commerce with which Finance had a
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including the Control of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934 which placed
restrictions on foreign ownership of industry (Daly, 1984). As early as 1955,
Finance had favoured repeal rather than amendment of the acts.9 In the face
of Industry and Commerce objections however, the acts were not amended
even when export profits tax relief was introduced (Barry, 2011). They were
partly amended in 1958, though the OEEC report on Ireland of that year
remarks that “… despite the recent relaxation of restrictions, the conditions
governing foreign investment in Ireland are still more restrictive than would
seem appropriate in the light of Ireland’s overriding need for new investment
and enterprise”.10 They were completely repealed only by an act of 1964.
The Department of Industry and Commerce was among the least
enthusiastic supporters of the Whitaker initiative that led ultimately to
Economic Development. McCarthy (1990, p. 47) notes that “Whitaker’s task-
force consulted the Department of Industry and Commerce only sporadically”.
Although the National Archives contain a list of queries submitted to Industry
and Commerce over the course of the preparation of Economic Development,
none relate to matters that remained contentious between the two
departments, including the merger of the industrial promotion agencies, the
ending of preferential regional grants for new industries, and planned capital
investments in steel, ship-building and a nitrogenous fertiliser plant.11
The sections on industry in the government First Programme involved
significant compromises between the views expressed in Economic Develop  -
ment and those held by Industry and Commerce. The original draft of the
section headed Foreign Participation opened with a statement that “… the
Government welcome foreign participation in the drive for expansion in
industry where it is likely to result in new industrial activity or an increase in
our industrial exports”. When these words appear in the Programme for
Economic Expansion, they are preceded by a statement reiterating the
government’s commitment to fostering Irish-owned industry: “… there are
substantial advantages in the development of industry under Irish ownership
and control. While this development will be fostered in every way, the
Government welcome foreign participation …”12
Industry and Commerce also succeeded in securing the removal of a draft
paragraph which would have ended their involvement in industrial promotion
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Development for the merger of the IDA and An Foras Tionscail was also
rejected; the Programme for Economic Expansion made the IDA responsible
for promotion, while grants awards would be the responsibility of An Foras
Tionscail.13
Early drafts of Economic Development had also called for consultation
with the World Bank before any decisions were taken to proceed with two
projects supported by the Department of Industry and Commerce: a
nitrogenous fertiliser plant and a major expansion of the state-owned 
Irish Steel plant in Cork harbour.14 Industry and Commerce’s response to
these recommendations was uncompromisingly negative and the proposals 
for World Bank involvement did not make it into the government
Programme.15
It is clearly ahistorical therefore to speak of “Whitaker’s industrial policy”.
Industrial policy was clearly under the control of Industry and Commerce. It
had successfully pushed through the export profits tax relief scheme to which
Whitaker and Finance were opposed, and while it had, as early as 1950,
recognised that granting the concession might induce export-oriented foreign
industry to establish in Ireland, it had resisted complete repeal of the Control
of Manufactures Acts, since this “… would permit of the unfettered investment
of outside capital in unsuitable as well as suitable cases”.16
And what, finally, of the question of linkages, which Walsh and Whelan
claim to have been “… a key contributor to the success of Irish exporting”?
Their claim is based on a 2007 paper which they co-authored and which
examines the importance of linkages in Irish manufacturing over the period
1972 to 2003. This is substantially later than the historical epoch with which
we – and their 2010 paper – are concerned. The nature of the FDI attracted to
Ireland in the later period would, furthermore, have been influenced by EU
accession.
The National Economic and Social Council in 1980 published a report by
Eoin O’Malley entitled Industrial Policy and Development: A Survey of
Literature from the Early 1960s. This examines, among other issues, the
question of linkage development for the earlier period. The findings from 
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representative study states that with the exception of food processing, “… the
linkage effects of the new industries have been limited. They have not 
created many opportunities for secondary investments”. Another concludes
that “… substantial linkage effects emanate from the food industries but 
the rest of the foreign sector approximates to enclave growth. Consequently,
the secondary stimulus to the domestic sector from the foreign firms is 
small”.
These earlier studies do not necessarily invalidate the backward
projection of the results from the later period, as the later study presumably
uses more advanced techniques. Walsh and Whelan do not present any
arguments that would justify such a backward projection, however. Indeed,
Ruane (1981), in a review of the NESC report, suggests that the finding of 
“… the absence of backward linkages between foreign investment and the rest
of the economy.. is hardly surprising.” Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh (1988, 
p. 245) concur, arguing that “… where foreign firms were engaged in transfer
pricing via imported inputs to maximise the tax advantage, this would tend to
discourage purchases from domestic producers”. 
CONCLUSIONS
Historical accuracy is clearly desirable. We have presented archival
evidence that Whitaker, as Secretary of the Department of Finance, opposed
the introduction of export profits tax relief (for clearly defensible reasons), that
he argued for immediate across the board tariff reductions rather than
advising that they be delayed until new export-oriented industry had came on
stream, and that he was overruled in arguing against decentralisation of
industry.
Whitaker did not play a hands-on part in the formulation of industrial
strategy and we have found no evidence that his thinking was influenced by
the industrial linkages concepts of Hirschman. In fact we judge this unlikely.
The only related discussion in Economic Development is in the context of
industries based on primary raw materials. Projects generating a demand for
indigenous materials and services were deemed to warrant special
consideration in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion (FitzGerald,
1968, 100). This however refers to a later period than that with which we, and
Walsh and Whelan, are concerned. This programme was scheduled to run from
1964 to 1970 but was jettisoned in 1967 (Lee, 1989, p. 353). There is no
evidence that linkages played an important role in Irish industrial
development in the pre-EU era.
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